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The United States Congress is now considering whether to raise 
US commitments to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A 
positive decision would ratify President Obama’s pledge in early 
April, taken with the other leaders of the G-20, to bolster the 
IMF as part of their cooperative response to the global economic 
crisis. The package of measures advanced by the G-20 leaders 
would triple the resources available to the Fund to $750 billion 
and would greatly reinforce its role in the international financial 
system. However, the IMF remains a controversial institution 
and congressional support cannot be taken for granted.
This policy brief analyzes the politics and merits of the 
IMF legislation before Congress. It reviews the fundamental 
rationale  for  maintaining  and  strengthening  the  institution; 
discusses the complex package, its elements, and their impor-
tance;  examines  their  relationship  to  US  interests;  addresses 
several of the common objections to the IMF and its lending 
programs; reviews the politics of the congressional ratification 
of the last request for additional IMF funding in 1997–98; and 
summarizes the conclusions.
I argue that the fundamental rationale for US support for 
the IMF remains valid and has been dramatically bolstered by 
the present crisis. Although critics raise a number of objections 
to the IMF, their legitimate concerns can best be addressed 
not by weakening the institution but by creating additional 
safeguards. The IMF should get full credit for its reforms since 
the 1997–98 crisis: improved transparency, revised conditional-
ity, and new lending facilities such as the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL). The IMF reflects US economic policy preferences more 
faithfully than perhaps any other international organization and 
congressional treatment should reflect this basic convergence 
of interest. Failure to approve the administration’s request, on 
the other hand, could damage financial confidence and retard 
global and US recovery from the crisis. 
THE FUNDAMENTAL RATIONALE FOR THE IMF
If  financial  markets  were  perfect—if  they  incorporated  all 
relevant  information  and  allocated  capital  efficiently—the 
fundamental rationale for the IMF would have weakened with 
the increase in international capital mobility over the last few 
decades. During the late 1990s, some analysts expressed the view 
that the IMF was obsolete in an era of internationally mobile 
private  capital:  If  trade  deficits  and  emerging  markets  were 
worth financing, they argued, the private markets would do so. 
The present crisis shows, if there were any lingering doubts, that 
private financial markets suffer from imperfect information and 
problems of collective action. Thus they exhibit herd behav-
ior and creditor panic (Masson and Mussa 1997). Emerging 
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markets face sudden stops of capital inflows, even when their 
governments have been pursuing appropriate policies. The basic 
purpose of the IMF in today’s world economy is to provide coun-
tervailing, official lending to offset these sudden stops, applying 
strong conditionality when policies must be adjusted and light 
conditionality when policies are appropriate. It thereby enables 
members to maintain and extend international economic open-
ness and smoothes payments adjustment, limiting the economic 
and social costs of crises. The IMF is therefore complementary 
to, not competitive with, private financial markets. 
The  first  of  the  Articles  of  Agreement  of  the  IMF  lays 
out  the  central  purposes  of  the  institution.  They  include:   
(a) promoting international monetary cooperation, (b) facilitat-
ing the “expansion and balanced growth of international trade” 
and “high levels of employment and real income,” (c) promoting 
“exchange stability” and “orderly exchange arrangements,” while 
avoiding  “competitive  exchange  depreciation,”  (d)  enabling 
members to correct payments imbalances without resorting to 
trade protection, and (e) reducing the duration and degree of 
payments imbalances. The founders of the IMF expected that 
these goals would be accomplished by the creation of a fund 
from which members could draw to finance payments imbal-
ances. Analogous to a credit union, the IMF was to be a revolv-
ing pool of international reserves from which countries could 
borrow and to which they would contribute. 
The  IMF  stood  at  the  center  of  a  fixed  but  adjustable 
exchange rate regime during the first 26 years of its existence. 
The  transition  to  flexible  exchange  rates  in  the  early  1970s 
raised questions about the institution’s raison d’être. But the 
two oil shocks of that decade and the debt crisis of the 1980s 
demonstrated  a  continuing  need  for  a  robust  official  fund 
for balance of payments financing, even in the absence of an 
obligation to defend currency parities. With an increase in the 
number of members and their external obligations as a result of 
capital mobility, the IMF mobilized successively larger amounts 
of financing with each new crisis. 
The IMF’s near-universal membership strongly reinforces 
the concept of the Fund as a conduit for official finance to 
counteract precipitate capital withdrawal. Withdrawn capital 
must flow somewhere, and the recipients are in a strong posi-
tion to counterbalance the private markets when appropriate 
with official capital inflows. Because the recipients are virtually 
all members of the IMF, they can best play this role through the 
institution.1
The role of the IMF extends well beyond providing offi-
cial finance to include monitoring the international monetary 
system,  fostering  negotiations  among  members  over  macro-
economic policy coordination and payments adjustment, and 
exercising  “firm  surveillance”  over  the  economic  policies  of 
members. These roles are important, especially for reducing the 
frequency and severity of financial crises proactively. But the 
ability to mobilize financial resources is central to the Fund’s 
influence in these functions.2
ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE
President Obama’s request to Congress for the IMF has four 
components.  The  first  would  increase  the  regular  US  quota 
contribution from about $56 billion to $64 billion and the 
second would raise an emergency line of credit to the institu-
tion from about $10 billion to roughly $110 billion. President 
Obama’s third request is for approval of gold sales to endow 
an investment fund to cover a large portion of the operational 
expenses of the IMF, a needed innovation, and his fourth is for 
approval to distribute a modest amount of reserve assets issued 
by the IMF, called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), primarily to 
countries that have not yet received them (requiring no congres-
sional appropriation). Separately, the IMF is also planning a 
$250 billion general SDR allocation, which requires the US 
Treasury to consult with Congress but does not need congres-
sional approval. Consider each element of the package in turn.
Quota Increase
The IMF is primarily funded through the contributions of its 
member states, called quotas. These are paid to the Fund in 
convertible and national currencies. The members review the 
need for an increase in overall quotas every five years, some-
times deciding to increase them. Even with occasional increases 
1. Governments of receiving countries cannot automatically access these flows 
for reverse lending, because capital flows in through private-sector channels. 
But they can secure access if they wish to do so through, for example, official 
purchases of foreign currency to restrain appreciation of the local currency and 
to build international reserves.
2. The literature on the IMF and its reform is extensive. On the evolution of 
the institution, see Pauly (1997), Boughton (2001), and Andrews (2008). For 
useful reviews of the main issues of reform, see Truman (2006a and 2006b) 
and, for a more skeptical treatment, Woods (2006).
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in quotas, however, the total size of the Fund has not kept pace 
with the growth of the world economy, international trade, and 
capital flows since its founding. As a percentage of world GDP 
and trade, the total size of the Fund has declined from 1 and   
13 percent in 1948 to 0.6 and less than 2 percent in 2008, 
respectively (figure 1 and IMF 2009). This decline limits the 
Fund’s ability to address financial crises when they arise. 
The present quota increase, agreed by the Board of Gover-
nors of the IMF in the spring of 2008, would raise overall quotas 
from about $325 billion to $357 billion (IMF 2008a).3 The US 
portion of this increase is about $8 billion.4
In addition to establishing a country’s contribution and its 
ability to borrow from the Fund, quotas set the voting weights 
of the members in the Board of Governors and the Executive 
Board, with a small number of additional votes distributed in 
equal measure to all members. As the largest contributor to 
the IMF, the United States wields more votes than any other 
single member. Because important decisions of the Fund must 
be approved by a supermajority of 85 percent of the votes, the 
United States, with 17.09 percent of total quotas and 16.77 
percent of total votes, wields a veto, as would any coalition of 
members with more than 15 percent of the votes. The proposed 
quota increase would preserve the US veto.
New Arrangements to Borrow
If the quota contributions to the IMF prove insufficient to meet 
the demand for loans during a crisis, as happened at the end 
of 1998, the Fund can access a line of credit with some of its 
members through the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). 
Building on the General Arrangements to Borrow, a smaller 
facility created in the 1960s, the NAB can mobilize the reserves 
of 26 countries up to the amount of about $50 billion. Created 
3. See also “IMF Board of Governors Adopts Quota and Voice Reforms by 
a Large Margin,” IMF Press Release No. 08/93, April 19, 2008, available at 
ww.imf.org (accessed on June 9, 2009). Quotas are formally denominated in 
SDRs. The US dollar figures attached to them are roughly stated, because the 
value of the dollar changes against the SDR as the dollar fluctuates against the 
other currencies that make up the SDR: the Japanese yen, British pound, and 
the euro. The rate of exchange in late May 2009 was $1.47638 per SDR, or 
0.650545 SDR per US dollar.
4. The US quota would increase SDR 4.97 billion, from SDR 37.1 billion to 
about SDR 42 billion. 
in the late 1990s, the NAB has been activated once, in Decem-
ber 1998 to support a loan to Brazil, which was repaid in March 
1999. 
Shortly after taking office at the outset of the Obama admin-
istration, US Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner proposed 
enlarging the NAB by up to $500 billion.5 This proposal was 
endorsed by the G-20 leaders at the London summit in early 
April (see appendix, paragraph 17). Once implemented, the 
enlarged NAB would replace a set of bilateral credit facilities 
for the IMF made available by several individual countries in 
early 2009, including Japan and the European Union.6 Because 
the US portion of the NAB has been about 20 percent, the 
United States would be offering up to $100 billion. This figure 
could decline somewhat if additional countries are brought into 
the NAB. However, because the NAB and quota payments are 
considered to be a line of credit for budgetary purposes, the 
impact on the federal budget would be a small fraction of this 
amount, a total of $5 billion spread over the next several fiscal 
years.7 
The NAB increase is thus ten times larger than the proposed 
quota increase. But it would only be used if the quota-based 
resources of the IMF proved insufficient to cover the medium-
term funding needs of member countries in a crisis, and then 
only if the lenders, including the United States, agreed to the 
activation. Reaching political agreement on the NAB increase 
is faster and easier than would be reaching agreement on a 
permanent increase in quotas of a similar magnitude. The G-20 
leaders have called upon the members of the Fund to launch a 
new set of negotiations over quotas and to conclude them by 
January 2011 (see appendix, paragraph 20). That review should 
not only increase regular quotas but also redistribute them to 
several of the faster-growing emerging-market countries more 
extensively than the current quota review. 
Gold Sales
In the early years of the institution, members contributed part 
of their IMF quotas in gold, at the rate of $35 per ounce. The 
5. “Prepared Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner in Advance of 
the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting,” March 
11, 2009, available at www.ustreas.gov (accessed on June 9, 2009). See also 
C. Fred Bergsten, “Needed: A Global Response to the Global Economic and 
Financial Crisis,” Testimony to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonprolifera-
tion and Trade, House Committee on International Relations, March 12, 
2009, available at www.piie.com (accessed on June 9, 2009).
6. A number of additional countries have indicated that they would buy bonds 
issued by the IMF, including China for up to $50 billion and Russia for up to 
$10 billion.
7. These funds are provided for in the text of the IMF legislation. This proce-
dure is a departure from standard practice since 1980; see below.
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enormous increase in the price of gold since then has created 
an opportunity to fund new projects with the proceeds of the 
valuation gain. But doing so requires realizing heretofore unre-
alized gains through sales to either official institutions or private 
markets. US representatives in the Fund require the approval of 
Congress to accede to such sales.
Gold sales have been harnessed to an important change in 
the income model for the IMF. The administrative budget of the 
IMF has been covered until now by the proceeds of its lending. 
This arrangement has created two problems. First, the costs of 
the IMF’s other activities (including surveillance, analysis, and 
coordination) have been born by the borrowers, which many 
view as inequitable. Second, the income of the Fund has been 
volatile while its expenses have been relatively steady. During 
the liquidity boom of the middle of this decade, the lack of 
balance-of-payments lending caused the IMF’s income to fall 
short  of  its  administrative  expenses,  forcing  the  Managing 
Director to release about 450 long-term employees, more than 
17 percent of the IMF’s total staff in 2007. In 2009, by contrast, 
its financial facilities are very much in demand and the IMF’s 
income has been restored; only now it is short of staff. The old 
income model of the IMF does not match its mission. 
In  January  2007,  the  Committee  to  Study  Sustainable 
Long-Term  Financing  of  the  IMF,  chaired  by  former  Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) General Manager Andrew 
Crockett, recommended that the income model of the IMF be 
changed. It proposed that the IMF sell 403.3 tons (12,965,649 
ounces) of gold and invest the proceeds in an investment account 
that would generate a return with which to cover the nonlend-
ing  portion  of  the  administrative  budget.8  This  investment 
income plus the returns from lending would put the IMF on 
a solid financial footing in the report’s estimation (Committee 
to Study Sustainable Long-Term Financing of the IMF 2007). 
In the spring of 2008, the Executive Board advanced this plan, 
proposing to the Board of Governors to sell this amount of gold 
(12.5 percent of the Fund’s total holdings of 3,217 tons) on the 
open market gradually over several years, subject to approval 
by member governments. Assuming a gold price of $850 per 
ounce,  the  Executive  Board  calculated  that  the  investment 
account would generate extra income of $475 million per year 
(IMF 2008b). 
Over  the  fourteen  months  since  the  Executive  Board’s 
report, the price of gold has risen further, to about $950, gener-
ating a series of proposals for the extra income that would be 
garnered by sales. Several nongovernmental organizations have 
proposed using the additional proceeds for poverty alleviation 
and debt relief for low-income countries, proposals for which 
8. The book value of these gold holdings is SDR 207, or about $320, per 
ounce.
some members of Congress, such as House Financial Services 
Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), have some sympa-
thy. President Obama’s request to Congress includes a request 
to authorize the use of some of the proceeds from gold sales to 
assist these countries. Although the amount is unspecified in the 
legislation, the G-20 leaders committed themselves to devoting 
$6 billion to low-income countries from “additional resources” 
raised from gold sales “together with surplus income.” The G-20 
specified that this would be used for “concessional and flexible 
finance” over the “next 2 to 3 years” and tasked the IMF with 
developing concrete proposals (see appendix, paragraph 25).
Special Drawing Rights
Special  Drawing  Rights  (SDRs)  are  an  international  reserve 
asset issued by the IMF. While not technically a claim on the 
IMF per se, they represent a claim on convertible currencies 
held in reserve by member states that have a strong balance of 
payments position. Members therefore hold SDRs in order to 
supplement their other international reserves and can convert 
them into dollars, euros, or other currencies when needed to 
temporarily finance payments deficits.9 
The members of the IMF created the SDR in the 1960s in 
order to solve a problem that plagues all international monetary 
systems that rely on national currency as the principal reserve 
asset: The supply of reserves, US dollars, did not correspond 
to the Bretton Woods system’s need for reserves. A fiat reserve 
asset, the SDR, was designed to supplement reserves and reduce 
reliance on the US dollar. This decision was made with the full 
support of the United States. Two separate decisions allocated a 
total of 21.4 billion SDRs during 1970–72 and 1979–81.
The IMF distributes SDRs to its members in two ways, 
through special and general allocations, both of which are part 
of the present package to bolster the Fund. A special alloca-
tion requires an amendment to the Articles of Agreement and 
thus congressional approval for US support. US support for a 
general allocation requires consultation with Congress but not 
its approval, provided that the size of the allocation falls below 
a particular threshold.
Special Allocation through the Fourth Amendment 
None of the members of the IMF that joined since 1981 have 
received SDRs. This group includes all those that joined the 
9. See Williamson (2009) for a discussion of the history of the SDR as well 
as an overview of proposals to enhance its role in the international monetary 
system. On US policymaking surrounding the creation of the SDR, see Odell 
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Fund following the collapse of communism and the end of 
the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, about one-
fifth  of  the  present  membership.10  In  September  1997  the 
IMF Board of Governors agreed to an allocation that would 
bring all members’ cumulative allocation of SDRs up to the 
percentage of their quotas (IMF 1997). Because this particular 
allocation would distribute SDRs disproportionately, it requires 
an amendment to the Articles, which in turn requires congres-
sional approval. The Clinton administration, however, declined 
to submit this amendment to Congress. Other countries none-
theless proceeded with ratification, approving the amendment 
by 78 percent of the weighted votes of all the members. US 
approval, and only US approval, is required to put the special 
allocation into effect. It would double the amount of SDRs 
outstanding to 42.8 billion (roughly equivalent to $63 billion). 
General Allocation
At the London summit, the G-20 leaders agreed to support 
a general allocation of SDRs in the amount of $250 billion 
equivalent (see appendix, paragraphs 5 and 19). At about SDR 
163 billion, the new allocation would increase the amount of 
SDRs outstanding by almost a factor of four. The G-20 lead-
ers advanced this proposal with the intent of supplementing 
reserves at a time when many countries are running short as 
a consequence of capital withdrawal during the present crisis. 
A large increase in SDRs outstanding would also partly obvi-
ate the need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves through 
currency  undervaluation  and  thus  would  help  to  avoid  the 
trade distortions that result from this practice.11 This general 
allocation would be small in proportion to world reserves, only 
about 3.75 percent of the total (including gold), but would 
nonetheless be meaningful for several countries. This allocation 
is distinct from, but related to, more fundamental proposals 
to substitute SDRs for US dollars in a special account or to 
displace the dollar with the SDR as the leading international 
currency (Williamson 2009).12 The US share of this allocation 
would be about SDR 28 billion, which would be held in the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund managed by the Treasury Depart-
ment (Henning 1999). The Obama administration began the 
10. Countries that joined between 1972 and 1981 have received partial alloca-
tions. 
11. See Edwin M. Truman, “How the Fund Can Help Save the World 
Economy,” Financial Times, March 5, 2009, available at www.piie.com (ac-
cessed on June 9, 2009).
12. See also C. Fred Bergsten, “How to Solve the Problem of the Dollar,” 
Financial Times, December 11, 2007, available at www.piie.com (accessed on 
June 9, 2009) and Zhou Xiaochuan, “Reform the International Monetary 
System,” May 23, 2009, available at www.pbc.gov.cn/english (accessed on June 
9, 2009).
necessary consultations with congressional leaders in mid-April, 
paving the way for formal approval of the allocation in the 
second half of July.13 
THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
US interests are advanced by the present legislation to increase 
the funds available to the IMF in at least six ways. First, by 
bolstering the IMF’s capacity to lend to hard-hit countries, it 
supports US exports and jobs as well as confidence in financial 
markets generally. Due to decades of globalization, the prosper-
ity of the US economy is bound closely to the prosperity of the 
world economy. US trade (exports plus imports) with countries 
that have borrowed from the IMF totals more than $400 billion 
per year. In 2008 US exports to emerging-market countries 
totaled more than $500 billion, while exports to and imports 
from emerging markets together totaled more than $1 trillion. 
Crisis lending helps to keep foreign markets open to trade and 
limits the potential for a collapse of currencies and growth that 
would harm US exports. 
Second,  reliance  on  the  IMF  distributes  the  burden  of 
fighting crises and stabilizing economies across the membership 
of the institution, rather than concentrating it on the shoul-
ders of the United States and other large countries. It avoids 
the tendency of smaller and medium-sized countries to slough 
the  burden  onto  the  largest.  In  the  IMF,  US  contributions 
are matched more than four fold by other states, a significant 
bargain for the United States. Were it to mount similar rescues 
unilaterally, the United States would have to take on far larger 
commitments.
 Third, although some have decried the legitimacy of the 
IMF, there is no question that the IMF has better standing to 
impose tough conditions on borrowers when needed than the 
United States or any other individual creditor. It is far better for 
a multilateral institution of which the borrower is a member to 
impose these conditions than to have creditor governments do 
so unilaterally. In addition to legitimacy considerations, unilat-
eral lending by multiple creditors carries the danger that loans 
will have conflicting terms and conditions.
Fourth, maintaining a robust multilateral financial institu-
tion reduces both the need for and attractiveness of regional 
financial facilities. Regional financial arrangements, such as the 
facilities operated by the European Union and those being devel-
oped by East Asian governments, are not necessarily antithetical 
13. Letters were sent to the chairman and ranking members of the Banking 
and Foreign Relations committees in the Senate, the Committee on Financial 
Services in the House, and their relevant subcommittees. See, for example, 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs David Vandivier’s letter to 
Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, 
April 13, 2009. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 2     J uNe   2 0 0 9
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to US interests (Henning 2006b and 2009). But their relation-
ship to US interests depends on how these facilities evolve, and 
the United States benefits from keeping the IMF a constructive, 
central player in crisis resolution—one that is capable of coordi-
nating bilateral, regional, and multilateral responses. 
 Fifth, a multilateral response to the crisis reinforces US 
foreign policy and security interests. Director of National Intel-
ligence Dennis C. Blair recently cited the global economic crisis 
as the primary near-term security threat to the United States.14 
Pakistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and several other countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe have negotiated or are in various stages of 
negotiating programs with the IMF. Many others, such as South 
Korea, stand to benefit from confidence generated by the IMF 
even though they may not borrow from it. 
Finally, congressional approval would bolster US leader-
ship in combating the crisis, assuage foreign misgivings about 
the undeniable US role in creating it, and spur foreign govern-
ments to contribute similarly. As the principal creator of the 
institution, the host for its headquarters, and the wielder of the 
largest number of votes, the United States is the single most 
influential member of the IMF. The US governor holds veto 
power in the governing bodies over the most important deci-
sions of the institution. Congressional rejection would undercut 
US leadership and greatly, perhaps fatally, weaken the US claim 
to its veto position within the Fund.
OBJECTIONS TO THE IMF
Critics have raised several objections to the IMF. This section 
considers five such arguments, often expressed by spokesmen 
for the political right, left, and center. These arguments revolve 
around the concept of moral hazard and concerns about bailing 
out banks, national sovereignty, policy conditionality, and the 
weakness of rule enforcement. 
Moral Hazard
Some  opponents  of  the  IMF  have  argued  that  its  existence 
and operations create moral hazard: recklessness on the part 
14. Walter Pincus and Joby Warrick, “Financial Crisis Called Top Security 
Threat to U.S.,” Washington Post, February 13, 2009, A14.
of private creditors when making lending decisions and on the 
part of borrowers when seeking financing. This argument was 
particularly prominent during the 1997–98 financial crisis and 
several subsequent blue-ribbon reports on reforming the inter-
national financial architecture. It is clear that IMF lending can 
have this effect in principle. In this respect, the institution is 
in the good company of all collective insurance arrangements 
that shield members from risk, both domestic and international. 
Municipal  fire  departments  and  automobile  insurance  also 
create moral hazard, yet we embrace them as useful institutions. 
The questions confronting the IMF are whether moral hazard is 
significant in practice and whether there are ways to contain it.
A substantial body of analysis has addressed this question. 
Of the two types, debtor moral hazard is the less dangerous, 
because  the  IMF  can  impose  policy  conditionality  and  the 
subsidy component of its lending is small. There is anecdotal 
evidence  that  creditor  moral  hazard  afflicted  some  specific 
cases, notably Russia in the mid-1990s, but broader evidence 
that IMF lending triggers capital flows to emerging markets is 
distinctly lacking. After carefully reviewing this literature and 
recent historical cases, Roubini and Setser (2004) concluded 
that “the empirical record does not suggest that IMF lending, in 
its current form, has created widespread moral hazard.” 
Bailing Out Banks
Since at least the early 1980s, critics have charged that IMF 
lending to countries facing financial crises is tantamount to bail-
ing out their creditors. The word “bailout” is often used loosely, 
but it should not be confused with public financing, especially 
when a coordinated response to a crisis preserves financial value 
for all parties. I use the term here to mean transferring risk and 
outright losses from the private sector to the public sector. The 
task is to ensure that IMF lending does not simply go toward 
repaying creditors (“round tripping”) but benefits borrowers by 
smoothing adjustment and restoring access to capital markets 
in the near term while improving the prospects for repaying 
private creditors in the longer term. The record since the Mexi-
can crisis of 1994–95 is mixed: In some cases, private banks 
reduced their exposure after their borrower received an IMF 
loan, whereas in several other prominent cases they did not. 
But in no case did the IMF sustain an outright loss. Moreover, 
private-sector “bail-ins”—creditor contributions to rescue pack-
ages through rollovers, debt exchanges, and new money—are 
more prevalent than commonly believed (Roubini and Setser 
2004, chapter 4). 
The solution to this serious problem is not to handicap 
the IMF with insufficient resources or to abolish it, but to bail 
in the creditors more consistently and forcefully. Fortunately, 
creditor governments and the IMF now have a broader range of 
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tools with which to accomplish this than they did in previous 
decades. Collective action clauses (CACs) have been introduced 
to bond contracts to facilitate restructuring when necessary. 
Creditor governments have also shown a willingness to let some 
debtors default outright, most notably in the case of Argentina. 
As a result of the present crisis, moreover, national governments 
are extending their regulatory reach over the financial sector, 
which empowers moral suasion over banks and other creditors 
to maintain their exposure to program countries. Governments 
are thus likely to be in a stronger position in the future to 
enforce private-sector bail-ins.15 
Sovereignty
Critics on the right often warn that participation in interna-
tional organizations will constrain the freedom of the United 
States to maneuver in international affairs. By its support for the 
IMF, they argue, the United States is bound to seek a working 
consensus with other members on the policies and direction of 
the institution, restricting its ability to operate independently. 
Three responses counter this argument. First, the United 
States created and participates in the IMF because the institu-
tion broadens rather than restricts the range of options avail-
able. The United States retains the ability to act unilaterally, 
by lending from the Exchange Stabilization Fund or by guar-
anteeing private loans, for example. Second, the multilateral 
option is useful because it greatly enhances the resources that 
can be brought to bear on any given crisis and gets the rest of 
the international community to share in the risk of such opera-
tions. Sharing control is a natural consequence of asking others 
to share the risk and cost. Third, despite the fact that the United 
States contributes only one-sixth of the IMF’s resources, it holds 
a veto over major decisions of the Fund and is by far the single 
most influential member. As observed at the outset, no interna-
tional organization reflects the economic policy preferences of 
the United States more faithfully than the IMF.
15. Governments could broaden their range of bail-in tools further by 
considering proposals analogous to domestic Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy 
proceedings, such as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Krueger 
2002). 
Policy Conditionality and Program Effectiveness
The policy conditions attached to Fund lending programs have 
attracted criticism from both the political right and left and 
are perhaps the most controversial aspect of the IMF outside 
the United States. The main criticisms have been that the IMF 
attaches conditions that stifle growth, harm the fight against 
poverty, and are cut from a uniform template that does not take 
into account the unique circumstances of individual countries.16 
Martin Feldstein (1998) criticized the IMF in 1998 for includ-
ing structural policy conditionality in its lending programs in 
Asia. Allan Meltzer advocated the abolition of policy conditions 
for medium-term financing in favor of short-term financing on 
the basis of several preconditions (International Financial Insti-
tutions  Advisory  Commission  2000).  Joseph  Stiglitz  (2002) 
criticized the conditionality applied in the 1990s for its procy-
clicality, its ignorance of domestic institutions, and on the need 
for sequencing. 
The  IMF  has  not  abandoned  conditionality  for  several 
compelling  reasons,  but  has  reviewed  its  programs,  adapted 
them,  and  introduced  facilities  that  enable  preapproved 
countries to borrow without having to undertake additional 
measures. The original reasons for adopting policy condition-
ality in Fund lending continue to apply. Adjustment is often 
necessary, and conditionality, when administered well, reduces 
the ultimate costs of a crisis to the borrower. Conditionality also 
facilitates repayment, thus protecting the Fund and its members 
against default, and discourages borrower moral hazard. But 
the IMF has acknowledged that structural conditionality can 
be counterproductive and has eliminated structural conditions 
from its recent programs (Goldstein 2001), while at the same 
time taking pains to protect government expenditures on social 
safety nets. It has also increased the participation of borrowing 
governments in the establishment of conditions, “ownership,” 
which  is  intended  to  reduce  the  conflict  between  required 
adjustment and domestic politics (Khan and Sharma 2003).
Finally, the IMF has expanded its range of lending facilities 
to include loan windows that require conditionality on an ex 
ante rather than an ex post basis. In March the IMF launched 
the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which enables countries that 
receive good reviews in the Article IV surveillance process to 
establish a line of credit in an amount of several multiples of 
their quota.17 Such countries would not have to submit to new 
policy adjustments should they draw on this credit line. Mexico, 
Colombia, and Poland have signed up for the new facility. These 
16. The literature on this topic is extensive. Useful overviews can be found, 
among other places, in IEO (2002 and 2003) and Mody and Rebucci (2006).
17. “IMF Implements Major Lending Policy Improvements,” March 24, 
2009, available at www.imf.org (accessed on June 9, 2009).
Analogous to a credit union, the IMF was 
to be a revolving pool of international 
reserves from which countries could borrow 
and to which they would contribute.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 2     J uNe   2 0 0 9

reforms do not satisfy all objections, but they clearly demon-
strate that the IMF can review its own programs and adapt to 
valid criticism with some alacrity. 
Enforcement Weakness
Some  have  argued  for  denying  the  IMF  additional  funding 
because  of  its  alleged  ineffectiveness  in  enforcing  its  norms 
and rules. Chinese exchange rate policy is perhaps the most 
frequently  cited  case  of  the  institution’s  limitations  in  this 
regard. The Articles of Agreement prohibit currency manipula-
tion to secure an unfair competitive advantage or that inhibits 
balance of payments adjustment. Although there is debate over 
the interpretation of this rule, Chinese currency policy during 
the mid-2000s represented the clearest case of a systemically 
important country to which this provision could apply. Yet the 
Executive Board of the IMF has not cited China as a country 
that manipulates its currency nor has it designated the renminbi 
as “fundamentally misaligned” in economic surveillance proce-
dures revised in 2007. This reticence frustrates independent 
analysts and, more importantly, members of Congress who have 
inveighed against renminbi undervaluation for some time. 
Nonetheless, withholding support in order to incentivize 
the IMF to enforce hard rules would be misguided and coun-
terproductive for several reasons. It is the cold reality of inter-
national politics that international organizations rarely enforce 
hard  rules  on  powerful  members.  An  expectation  that  they 
might do so confuses the principal-agent relationship involved: 
International institutions are the agents of the governments that 
create them, not the other way around. When the rules of an 
institution conflict with the core interests of a major state, typi-
cally it is the rules that give way rather than state interests. The 
reasons for this are several, including the fact that the potential 
target, in this case China, sits on the governing bodies of the 
institution, in this case the Executive Board, and is therefore in 
a position to block reprimands or sanctions.18 Attributing the 
moral force and effectiveness of domestic law to international 
18. Dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization has been 
relatively successful because decisions are generally narrower in scope, impinge 
less on core interests, and are ultimately enforced by the ability of aggrieved 
members to take retaliatory action. These qualities are not easily transferred to 
the IMF.
norms  and  rules  is  to  fundamentally  misunderstand  inter-
national relations. Those who had hoped that the IMF could 
reverse Chinese undervaluation by rule enforcement and who 
are now disillusioned have been the victims of inflated expecta-
tions (Henning 2006a).
Instead,  international  organizations  are  useful  because, 
when states’ interests coincide, they facilitate exchange of infor-
mation,  provide  analysis,  broker  Pareto-improving  bargains 
among member states, and monitor compliance.19 In addition 
to providing financing to combat financial crises, the IMF has 
been manifestly useful in these roles. It would certainly be incon-
sistent for Congress to attach unrealistic or extraneous condi-
tions on US support or to withhold support entirely and then to 
later bemoan the weakness of the institution. Those who want a 
stronger IMF should support it financially and politically.
By realistic standards for international organizations, the 
IMF has been very effective in its roles generally. It is precisely 
this effectiveness that attracts politicization, as governments, 
interest groups, and nongovernmental organizations see it as 
a useful vehicle for other objectives. If it were not effective, it 
would not be controversial. 
US POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
Congress plays a central role in US policy toward the IMF. 
US approval of the most important decisions of the Fund—
amendments to the Articles of Agreement, increases in quota 
contributions, borrowing arrangements, and gold sales, among 
others—must  be  approved  by  Congress.  Although  the  IMF 
advances US interests in several ways, congressional review has 
sometimes lacked strength and focus, and its support has not 
always been reliable. 
There  are  several  reasons  for  this  disconnect  between 
overall national interest and Congress’s treatment of the IMF. 
First, while IMF crisis lending buoys the US economy, that 
relationship is indirect and the benefits are broadly dispersed. 
The benefits cannot easily be captured by interest groups or 
corporations. Interest groups are thus unlikely to make support 
for the IMF a priority on their political agenda for policy activ-
ism in Washington. In this respect, the IMF and international 
monetary policy generally contrast with the interest group poli-
tics of trade policy, where specific firms and sectors can expect 
to capture benefits from trade measures (Gowa 1988).
Members of Congress are similarly unlikely to give the IMF 
top priority on their legislative agenda. Unlike domestic finan-
cial institutions, the IMF cannot lend to or manage the assets 
19. As conceptualized by the institutionalist approach to international rela-
tions. See, for example, Keohane (1984).
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of their constituents. Unlike federal agencies, the IMF does not 
serve the constituents in their states or districts directly. Within 
Congress, moreover, responsibility for legislation and oversight 
is fragmented, with the banking, international relations, and 
appropriations committees of both houses involved. So, as in 
the case of other international institutions, few members of 
Congress are willing to champion the IMF; it is “orphaned.” 
Finally, Congress is wary of letting the authority that it jealously 
guards  in  disputes  with  the  executive  branch  over  domestic 
matters slip away under the guise of international cooperation.20 
Outright opposition to the IMF in Congress tends not to be 
broad and intense, but neither is support a high priority for 
most members. 
The Treasury, which formulates US policy in the IMF, is 
the main advocate of legislation that supports the institution. It 
may rely on the White House to advance legislation on Capitol 
Hill or it may take the lead directly, depending on the particular 
circumstances. When quota reviews or amendments come onto 
the IMF’s agenda, senior Treasury officials consider the atti-
tudes of Congress and whether the measure is worth the effort 
of seeking congressional approval before giving a green light in 
the governing bodies of the IMF. After submitting legislation 
to the Hill, Treasury will lead an effort to mobilize support 
among other executive agencies, such as the Commerce, State, 
and Defense departments; private interest groups; and opinion 
leaders. The mobilization of interest groups in support of the 
original Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945 serves as the 
classic example of Treasury’s success in building a coalition. But 
the coalitions thus created tend to be shifting and unstable; the 
task of renewing a supportive coalition has become progres-
sively more demanding with time. Recent administrations have 
thus avoided seeking congressional approval for IMF legislation 
unless it was urgent. Recent requests have tended to coincide 
with major international financial crises (Lavelle forthcoming). 
Of the three quota increases since the advent of the Reagan 
20. Lavelle (forthcoming) offers the most comprehensive account available of 
the US politics of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
administration,  one  accompanied  the  Latin  American  crisis 
of the early 1980s and another the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–98. The third coincided with the end of the Cold War, 
which presented exceptional arguments in favor of multilateral 
financial cooperation (table 1).
The last request for congressional approval of IMF funding 
came during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Beginning in 
July 1997 in Thailand, this crisis engulfed the region in autumn 
of that year and had spread globally by mid-1998. It caused 
output  declines  in  affected  countries  substantially  exceed-
ing  any  previous  postwar  recession.  The  Asian  crisis  closely 
followed the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–95, the rescue for 
which prompted congressional objections, investigations, and 
temporary constraints on the use of the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund (Henning 1999). The international financial community 
responded by creating the New Arrangements to Borrow, which 
had yet to receive congressional approval when the crisis in 
Thailand struck. 
Aware  that  the  IMF  had  committed  or  was  about  to 
commit $53.5 billion in a span of three months as part of a set 
of rescue packages totaling more than $100 billion, the Clinton 
administration requested approval of the NAB in November 
1997. In late December President Clinton requested congres-
sional approval of the US contribution to the $87.5 billion 
quota increase as well and called for full funding in his State of 
the Union Address in late January 1998. The total US commit-
ment would be about $17.9 billion, $14.5 billion for the quota 
increase and $3.4 billion for the NAB, to be authorized and 
appropriated but involving no net outlay and with no conse-
quences for the budget deficit. 
Congressional consideration of these measures was lengthy 
and  tortured,  notwithstanding  the  proliferation  of  the  crisis 
and the drain of IMF resources. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee  and  the  House  Financial  Services  Committee, 
among others, held hearings at which administration officials 
and  private-sector  representatives  testified  in  favor  of  IMF 
funding. These witnesses included Treasury Secretary Robert E. 
Rubin, UN Ambassador Bill Richardson, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
and  US  Trade  Representative  Charlene  Barshefsky.  Inter-
est-group representatives included officials from the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau, and 
individual companies, such as Boeing. The US Chamber of 
Commerce organized a coalition of 300 members in support. 
Eighty-eight business leaders signed an open letter to Congress 
with former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford (Scott 
and Carter 2005).
But other interest groups and experts raised obstacles to 
the  legislation.  Labor-union  representatives  proposed  tying 
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IMF funds to institutional reforms and the improvement of 
labor  conditions  in  program  countries.  Former  Secretary  of 
State, Treasury, and Labor, and former Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) George Shultz advocated the 
abolition of the IMF, as did presidential candidate Steve Forbes. 
The Wall Street Journal opposed the funding request, and Jeffrey 
Sachs and George Soros, among others, criticized the condi-
tionality applied to IMF loans (Scott and Carter 2005).
Most members of Congress did not oppose the IMF or its 
funding outright; instead they sought to use the administration’s 
request as a vehicle for their own agendas. Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-NC), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
attached his plan to reorganize US foreign assistance organi-
zations to the IMF funding bill. In the House, Representative 
Christopher Smith (R-NJ) instead attached his plan to block 
international aid agencies that received US funds from advo-
cating abortion in family planning, the so-called Mexico City 
provision. The two provisions competed with one another and 
President Clinton threatened to veto legislation with the Mexico 
City provision. After passing their respective bills, the House 
and Senate were at an impasse (Lavelle forthcoming, Sanford 
forthcoming, and Scott and Carter 2005).
Meanwhile,  the  financial  crisis  spread  to  Russia,  which 
defaulted on $17 billion of government debt when the IMF 
refused a second program in the summer of 1998. This caused a 
“flight to liquidity” that trapped the large hedge fund Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), requiring a rescue organized by 
the Federal Reserve and eventually three, rapid, quarter-point 
cuts in US interest rates. As the crisis deepened, administra-
tion officials, congressional leadership, and the bill’s managers 
intensified negotiations. A bargain was finally struck in confer-
ence committee on October 7 that kept the Helms amendment, 
struck the Mexico City provisions, stipulated a substantial list of 
reforms for the Fund, and established an advisory committee to 
review the institution. The final bills were passed at the end of 
the legislative session and signed into law on October 21, 1998. 
The 1997–98 case illustrates several enduring patterns in 
the congressional politics of the IMF.21 First, opposition often 
comes from a coalition of strange bedfellows that is from the 
outer extremes of both parties. Second, support, while it tends 
to come from the center, is usually moderate in intensity rather 
than strong. Third, as many members’ second or third prior-
ity, IMF legislation can often be used as a vehicle for members’ 
top priorities. Fourth, party control of the two branches can be 
critical; without a majority in Congress, the Clinton adminis-
tration had difficulty imposing discipline on the attachment of 
extraneous amendments to the IMF legislation.22 
Finally, the case speaks to the relationship between congres-
sional action, or inaction in this case, and international financial 
markets. At the end of July 1998, Treasury officials estimated that 
the IMF held $3–5 billion available for new lending (Blustein 
2001, 293–94). Its quota increase could not go into effect until 
Congress acceded to the US contribution. One has to ask to 
what extent the congressional delay contributed to the flight to 
liquidity in the wake of the Russian default. Although it would 
be difficult to demonstrate the counterfactual case conclusively, 
more expeditious congressional passage of the IMF legislation 
might have boosted confidence and helped to contain capital 
flight from emerging markets in the late summer and autumn 
of 1998. 
The counterfactual 1998 scenario is particularly relevant 
now,  as  Congress  considers  whether  to  act  on  the  Obama 
administration’s  request  quickly  or  to  deliberate  at  greater 
length. As of May 21, 2009, the IMF posts a one-year forward 
commitment capacity of SDR 32.5 billion, to which we could 
add SDR 34 billion under the NAB and a $100 billion credit 
line from Japan.23 Given the magnitude of the present crisis, 
one should ask what the impact of a worsening of the crisis 
might be on international markets in the absence of expeditious 
passage of the IMF legislation. 
Recent objections to the US contribution in Congress have 
centered on budget accounting, transparency, and the approval 
process. The approval process and budgetary treatment have 
varied  substantially  over  the  history  of  US  participation  in 
the IMF (Sanford and Weiss 2009). Between 1980 and 1998, 
IMF contributions were authorized and appropriated but not 
scored as an outlay because the United States receives an equiva-
lent claim on the IMF that it can cash at any time. President 
Obama’s OMB Director, Peter Orszag, has argued that appro-
21. See also Broz and Hawes (2006) and Broz (2008), which analyze the 
determinants of congressional voting on the IMF.
22. The Carter administration faced similar difficulty even with Democratic 
dominance in Congress but did not have a crisis of similar magnitude to sup-
port an argument for party discipline.
23. “IMF Financial Activities—Update May 21, 2009,” available at www.imf.
org (accessed on June 9, 2009).
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priation was inconsistent with the absence of an outlay.24 A Wall 
Street Journal editorial decried the administration’s approach by 
saying, “it’s all opacity all the time.”25 But the budget commit-
tees of both houses decided to apply the Federal Credit Reform 
Act of 1990, under which only risk-weighted exposure would 
be appropriated, a Solomon-like solution. The Congressional 
Budget Office thus scored the $100 billion line of credit through 
the NAB and the $8 billion quota increase together as $5 billion 
for appropriation. The $5 billion would be entered as outlays in 
the federal budget, probably in increments spread out over the 
next several fiscal years (Sanford and Weiss 2009).26 Given that 
the United States has not lost a penny on its contribution to the 
IMF over the 65-year history of the institution and that the IMF 
remains a preferred creditor, even this limited scoring is very 
conservative. US government exposure to the IMF contrasts 
sharply with its exposure in the rescue of the domestic banking 
and financial system, such as through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), on which large losses can be expected. 
CONCLUSION
This  analysis  has  reviewed  the  merits,  politics,  and  policy 
process surrounding President Obama’s request for congressio-
nal approval of substantially increased funding for the IMF. It 
has surveyed the basic rationale for the IMF, the elements of 
the present package of reforms, and some of the most common 
objections to the institution. I have argued that the IMF is 
complementary to rather than in conflict with the expansion 
of private capital markets. The institution is needed to stabilize 
markets and to provide international public goods now more 
than ever. For these reasons, the G-20 leaders turned mainly to 
the IMF in their efforts to resolve the present global economic 
crisis. By fostering stability and openness abroad, strengthening 
the IMF advances the economic and financial interests of the 
United States. 
Congressional approval of these measures is also essential for 
maintaining US leadership in international economic relations 
and foreign affairs generally. Congress should not take US influ-
24. David Rogers, “Orszag’s Power Play,” Politico, April 22, 2009.
25. Wall Street Journal, “What’s Another $108 Billion?” May 18, 2009.
26. See also Douglas Elmendorf, “Budget Implications of U.S. Contributions 
to the International Monetary Fund,” Congressional Budget Office Director’s 
Blog, May 19, 2009, available at http://cboblog.cbo.gov (accessed May 19, 
2009).
ence within the IMF or other nations’ willingness to support it 
for granted. Congressional support would sustain the leadership 
that the United States has shown since it led in the creation of 
the IMF in 1944. Conversely, failure to support the institution 
during this financial crisis would not only jeopardize the global 
and US economic recoveries but also damage US influence. The 
United States might be able to sustain its veto within the IMF as 
a legal matter, but congressional rejection would be very costly 
for the United States in diplomatic terms and could possibly 
render the veto position politically unsustainable. 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts from the G-20 London Summit Leaders’ Statement, 
“The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform,” April 2, 2009, 
available at www.g20.org (accessed on June 9, 2009). 
5.  The agreements we have reached today, to treble resources 
available to the IMF to $750 billion, to support a new 
SDR allocation of $250 billion, to support at least $100 
billion  of  additional  lending  by  the  MDBs,  to  ensure 
$250 billion of support for trade finance, and to use the 
additional resources from agreed IMF gold sales for conces-
sional finance for the poorest countries, constitute an addi-
tional $1.1 trillion programme of support to restore credit, 
growth and jobs in the world economy. Together with the 
measures we have each taken nationally, this constitutes a 
global plan for recovery on an unprecedented scale. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 2                                                                                                                   Ju Ne   2 0 0 9
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nance to reflect changes in the world economy and the new 
challenges of globalisation, and that emerging and develop-
ing economies, including the poorest, must have greater 
voice and representation. This must be accompanied by 
action to increase the credibility and accountability of the 
institutions through better strategic oversight and decision 
making. To this end: 
l  we commit to implementing the package of IMF quota 
and voice reforms agreed in April 2008 and call on the 
IMF to complete the next review of quotas by January 
2011; 
l  we  agree  that,  alongside  this,  consideration  should 
be given to greater involvement of the Fund’s Gover-
nors in providing strategic direction to the IMF and 
increasing its accountability; 
l  we commit to implementing the World Bank reforms 
agreed in October 2008. We look forward to further 
recommendations, at the next meetings, on voice and 
representation reforms on an accelerated timescale, to 
be agreed by the 2010 Spring Meetings; 
l  we agree that the heads and senior leadership of the 
international financial institutions should be appoint-
ed  through  an  open,  transparent,  and  merit-based 
selection process; and 
l  building on the current reviews of the IMF and World 
Bank we asked the Chairman, working with the G-20 
Finance Ministers, to consult widely in an inclusive 
process  and  report  back  to  the  next  meeting  with 
proposals for further reforms to improve the respon-
siveness and adaptability of the IFIs. 
Ensuring a Fair and Sustainable Recovery for All
25.  We are determined not only to restore growth but to lay 
the foundation for a fair and sustainable world economy. 
We recognise that the current crisis has a disproportion-
ate impact on the vulnerable in the poorest countries and 
recognise our collective responsibility to mitigate the social 
impact of the crisis to minimise long-lasting damage to 
global potential. To this end: 
l  we have committed, consistent with the new income 
model, that additional resources from agreed sales of 
IMF gold will be used, together with surplus income, 
to provide $6 billion additional concessional and flex-
ible finance for the poorest countries over the next 2 
to 3 years. We call on the IMF to come forward with 
concrete proposals at the Spring Meeting...
Strengthening Our Global Financial Institutions
17.  Emerging markets and developing countries, which have 
been the engine of recent world growth, are also now facing 
challenges which are adding to the current downturn in the 
global economy. It is imperative for global confidence and 
economic recovery that capital continues to flow to them. 
This will require a substantial strengthening of the interna-
tional financial institutions, particularly the IMF. We have 
therefore agreed today to make available an additional $850 
billion of resources through the global financial institutions 
to  support  growth  in  emerging  market  and  developing 
countries by helping to finance counter-cyclical spending, 
bank recapitalisation, infrastructure, trade finance, balance 
of payments support, debt rollover, and social support. To 
this end: 
l  we have agreed to increase the resources available to 
the IMF through immediate financing from members 
of  $250  billion,  subsequently  incorporated  into  an 
expanded  and  more  flexible  New  Arrangements  to 
Borrow,  increased  by  up  to  $500  billion,  and  to 
consider market borrowing if necessary; and 
l  we support a substantial increase in lending of at least 
$100 billion by the Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs),  including  to  low  income  countries,  and 
ensure that all MDBs have the appropriate capital. 
18.  It is essential that these resources can be used effectively 
and flexibly to support growth. We welcome in this respect 
the progress made by the IMF with its new Flexible Credit 
Line (FCL) and its reformed lending and conditionality 
framework which will enable the IMF to ensure that its 
facilities address effectively the underlying causes of coun-
tries’ balance of payments financing needs, particularly the 
withdrawal of external capital flows to the banking and 
corporate sectors. We support Mexico’s decision to seek an 
FCL arrangement. 
19.  We  have  agreed  to  support  a  general  SDR  allocation 
which will inject $250 billion into the world economy 
and increase global liquidity, and urgent ratification of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
20.  In  order  for  our  financial  institutions  to  help  manage 
the  crisis  and  prevent  future  crises  we  must  strengthen 
their longer term relevance, effectiveness and legitimacy. 
So alongside the significant increase in resources agreed 
today  we  are  determined  to  reform  and  modernise  the 
international financial institutions to ensure they can assist 
members and shareholders effectively in the new challenges 
they face. We will reform their mandates, scope and gover-N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 2     J uNe   2 0 0 9
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Table 1     Congressional approval of IMF measures
Event
IMF Board of 
Governors resolution
Overall increase  
(billions of  US dollars)a
US contribution  
(billions of US dollars) Congress
Signed  
into law
The Bretton Woods Agreements Act July , 1 . . th July 1, 1
1st General Quota Review (10) No increase proposed – – 1st –
nd General Quota Review (1) No increase proposed – – th –
rd General Quota Review February  and  
April , 1
. 1. th June 1, 1
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) January , 1   th June 1, 1
th General Quota Review March 1, 1 . 1.0 th June , 1
1st Amendment to the Articles of  
   Agreement
May 1, 1 .b .b 0th June 1, 1
th General Quota Review February , 10 .0 1. 1st December 0, 10
Par Value Modification (1) – – 0.c nd May 1, 1
Par Value Modification (1) – – 0.0c rd October , 1
th General Quota Review and the nd 
   Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
March , 1 1. 1. th October 1, 1
Supplementary Financing Facility  
   (“Witteveen Facility”)
August , 1 10. 1. th October 10, 1
th General Quota Review December 11, 1 .00 . th October , 10
th General Quota Review March 1, 1 . . th November 0, 1
GAB Increase February, 1 1.1 . th November 0, 1
Interest Subsidy Account of the 
   Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
December , 1 – 0.1 101st December 1, 1
th General Quota Review and the rd  
   Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
June , 10  1.1 10nd October , 1
10th General Quota Review (1) No increase proposed – – 10th –
New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) January , 1 .0 . 10th October 1, 1
11th General Quota Review January 0, 1 . 1. 10th October 1, 1
1th General Quota Review (00) No increase proposed – – 10th –
1th General Quota Review (00) No increase proposed – – 110th –
Ad Hoc Quota Increase April , 00 .  111th Pending
NAB Increase April , 00 0 100 111th Pending
a. Until 1 IMF resources were denominated in US dollars; subsequently, they are denominated in SDR. After 1 US dollar amounts are calculated using the 
average USD/SDR exchange rate for that year.
b. This is a credit from the IMF to the members and to the United States, respectively.
c. These amounts were disbursed in 1 as a one-time maintenance-of-value payment to the IMF.
Sources: International Monetary Fund; Library of Congress; LexisNexis Congressional;  Horsefield (1); CBO (1); de Vries (1).N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 2                                                                                                                   Ju Ne   2 0 0 9
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percent of world foreign exchange reserves percent of international trade
percent of world GDP
Notes: For 00 total IMF quotas include the ad  hoc increase of 11. percent agreed in 00; 00 foreign exchange reserves data are as of March 
00; 00 GDP and international trade are IMF WEO estimates; nominal GDP for 10–10 imputed based on Maddison (00); international 
trade in services data available from 10; before 10, trade in services calculated using growth rates for trade in goods. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO); World Bank, World Development Indicators; Maddison (00).